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Lack of Personal, Social and Cosmic
Integration:
Original Sin from an Eschatological Perspective
_____________________________________________
H e n r y  L .  N o v e l lo
Abstract: This essay critically examines traditional formulations of the
doctrine of original sin in Western theology and the contemporary
“situationist” and “personalist” reformulations of the doctrine in the
search for an adequate understanding of original sin that acknowledges
both the evolutionary view of the world and Jesus Christ risen as the new
“emergent whole” in evolutionary history. The negative portrayal of
original sin as a situational privation of sanctifying grace and the positive
portrayal of original sin as rebellion against God are both held to be valid
and complementary, but it is argued that only a thoroughly eschato-
logical perspective can illuminate the state of the human condition which
is destined for a supernatural end in the Risen One. The essay concludes
with the proposition that original sin is best thought of in terms of the
lack of personal, social and cosmic integration that humans invariably
experience in this life, and that the person of the risen Christ saves us
from this complex state of privation by elevating us to a “higher nature”
that represents a “new creation”.
THE VALIDITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN continues to be
upheld today as central to the Christian faith because it affirms, against
a purely naturalistic view of human destiny, that the human condition
is such that it is incapable of attaining integrity of being and personal
fulfilment without the grace of God in Jesus Christ.1 The basic purpose
of the doctrine is to establish the universality of sin as a presupposition
for the affirmation of the universal redemption that comes in the
                                                                                            
1. That the doctrine of original sin is still very much a theological concern today is
evident, for example, in that an entire issue of Concilium (2004/1) was recently dedicated
to this topic. Original Sin: A Code of Fallibility, edited by Christophe Boureux and
Christoph Theobald (London: SCM Press, 2004).
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person of Jesus Christ. But if the task of the theologian today is to
demonstrate “how one can and must accept the reality of the situation
which the phrase ‘original sin’ was designed to cover”,2 then the
substance of the doctrine must be reformulated in terms that reflect our
understanding of the world today. The traditional framework of the
doctrine consisted of a static world-view where human history is
oriented towards its beginning in a single human couple (Adam and
Eve). This beginning is seen as marked by an original “fall” that brings
detrimental consequences not only for the first human couple but also
for all subsequent human beings as biological descendants of the first
human couple.
In the contemporary context, however, this static view of the world
has been replaced by a dynamic world-view where there is hardly
room for a pristine paradise, much less for an original fall with
catastrophic results for all. The natural sciences paint a fascinating
picture of an evolving universe, as well as an evolving homo sapiens , so
that evolution is not restricted to cosmic and biological evolution
alone, but also encompasses cultural evolution (the civilising
imperative) and the emergence of the religious dimension of existence
in our world. This implies that the reality described by the term
original sin should not exclude the natural-biological and historical-
cultural spheres in their connection with the personal-religious nature
of the reality described by the term original sin.
The view of the human as made up of integral aspects that are in
need of being integrated into a “higher nature” was discussed in an
earlier essay of mine entitled “Integral Salvation in the Risen Christ:
The New Emergent Whole”,3 where it was argued that the model of
“emergentist monism” is the most adequate model of personhood.
According to this model in which new properties emerge with
increasingly complex systems, the human person, as an agent who has
intentionality, is the “whole” in the complex system which is the
“human-brain-in-the-human-body-in-social-relations”.4 The human
person is the supreme example of “whole-part influence”, that is, the
view that the underlying physical state of affairs is not sufficient for
explaining the emergent properties of the higher-level entity. That the
whole exercises an influence on the parts means that the human person
strives to integrate all the levels (physical, biological, psychological,
                                                                                            
2. Gabriel Daly, Creation and Redemption (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988) 117.
3. Henry Novello, “Integral Salvation in the Risen Christ: The New Emergent Whole”,
Pacifica 17 (2004) 34-54. In this earlier essay I pointed out that the doctrine of sin must be
thought out from the standpoint of the dynamics of the ultimate revealed in Jesus Christ
risen (49). The present essay attends to this necessary task in contemporary theology.
4. Novello, “Integral Salvation in the Risen Christ”, 41-42.
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moral, intellectual, social, spiritual) of the complex system so as to
attain personal identity and integrity of being in active engagement
with all-that-is.
In such a dynamic perspective human nature cannot be thought as a
definitively known quantity, but as an unfolding and emerging reality
in quest of a higher nature. As a referring beyond itself to something
else, the human process of transcendence into something that is not
only quantitatively more complex but also qualitatively new gives rise
to an increase of being to an already existing reality (creatio ex
creatione). The fact that it is precisely evolving nature that makes the
human possible implies that human nature, which the doctrine of
original sin seeks to expound, has a markedly eschatological
orientation. This is clearly affirmed by the founding event of the
Christian faith, namely, the glorification of the body of the Crucified
One who is the new “emergent whole” in evolutionary history, the
definitive revelation of the higher nature towards which the process of
evolving nature has been ultimately destined by God. The doctrine of
original sin must therefore be rethought in terms of the dynamics of
the Ultimate, that is, the dynamics of the Risen One who is the “Real
One” (Bonhoeffer).
The first part of this essay will discuss theological traditions of the
doctrine of original sin, represented by Augustine and Aquinas, to
determine whether there are enduring insights in their portrayals of
the doctrine and whether a synthesis between the two is possible. The
second part will then briefly examine two modern reinterpretations of
the doctrine, namely, the “situationist” and “personalist” positions
which bear a family resemblance to the Thomistic and Augustinian
formulations of the doctrine respectively, and will conclude with a
discussion of the eschatological perspective introduced above. The
third and final part will present a series of four interrelated theses that
outline a more comprehensive eschatological approach to original sin
in which the intentions of the classical doctrine are maintained while
acknowledging the import of the contemporary scientific view of the
world. The strength of the eschatological approach, I shall argue, is
that it makes unequivocally clear that the reality of sin does not
constitute our first ontological status; rather, what is original is our
being destined to partake of Christ’s divine identity (filii in Filio ) and
enjoy the beatitude of glorious union with God in a “new heaven and
new earth” (Revelation 21). Paradise is less in the past than in the
future (cf. Irenaeus of Lyons) when God will become “all in all” (1 Cor
15:28). To participate in the very life of God is the supernatural destiny
of evolving creation.
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1. AUGUSTINIAN AND THOMISTIC THEOLOGICAL TRADITIONS
Augustine is considered to be the “Father” of the doctrine of
original sin.5 His interpretation of the key texts of Genesis 2-3 and Rom
5:12 exercised a profound influence on the Western Christian mind up
to the time of the modern era when it had to contend with the
challenge posed by historical-critical consciousness. Augustine saw in
these texts nothing but the one sin which Adam transmitted to his
posterity by way of biological propagation.6 In order to appreciate
Augustine’s position, it is necessary to briefly discuss the controversies
against the pessimism of the Manicheans over the nature of evil on the
one hand, and the optimism of the Pelagians concerning the nature of
human freedom on the other.
Augustine rejected Manichean gnosticism’s metaphysical-dualistic
idea that matter is a negative principle eternally opposed to the good
God, which gives rise to an ontological view of evil. He opposed this
by formulating an ethical view of evil based upon the biblical
affirmation regarding the inherent goodness of created reality (Gen
1:31), which is axiomatic in his thinking. It follows from this axiom that
a flaw can exist only as a fault in a good nature, which is to say that
evil cannot be a substance but is parasitical upon the good. This means
that both Satan and Adam sinned not from the very beginning of their
existence, but from the beginning of their sin. Evil is therefore held to
be an historical phenomenon which affects mutable created natures and
the events in which they are involved.7 By historicising the creation
                                                                                            
5. Julius Gross makes this statement in his monumental work on the history of the
doctrine. Geschichte des Erbsündendogmas: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Problems vom
Ursprung des Übels (2 Bde.; München: Ernst Reinardt, 1960-72) 1. 375.
6. The universality of sin was traditionally upheld by citing the Latin phrase in quo
omnes peccaverunt where the in quo (in whom) was given as the translation of the Greek
phrase eph ho . But it is now widely recognised that the in quo is a mistranslation of the
Greek eph ho which should be rendered “because” or “on the condition that”. In this case
the peccaverunt refers not to humankind’s sin in Adam but to each individual’s personal
sins in each of which the sin of Adam is freely ratified. Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans (New
York: Doubleday, 1993) 413-416, provides an analysis of the various meanings that have
been debated and a list of modern commentators who endorse the translation “because”.
7. According to Augustine, the fall of Satan and the fall of Adam were chance events;
they were a turning away from the good (see De Vera Religione xxi. 41): hence the words
used to describe evil include perversus, perversitas, aversio, defectio, lapsus, deformitas,
deviare, and infirmare. Moreover, since an evil event is not a mindless happening, only
creatures with the faculty of mind are capable of acting against the good. Augustine
located the source of evil in the rational will, so that bad creatures differ from the good
not by nature but by fault (De Civ. Dei XII, i; De Natura et Gratia I.iii.3). Thus the demonic
forces are seen as working on the human mind and will; they are not to be feared for
what they can do to the outside world, but for their ability to make us evil within by
presenting what is unreasonable to our minds in the guise of something eminently
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narrative, Augustine was logically led to affirming both a period
before the first sin of Adam which he described as a “state of integrity”
(posse non peccare, which allows room for the serpent’s temptation and
the fall), and a period subsequent to the transgression which he
referred to as the “state of corruption” (non posse non peccare, in which
it is not possible to realise good without the redemptive grace of God
in Jesus Christ). What was lost by the first sin of Adam was freedom
from disorderliness of desire and freedom from death. The problem for
Augustine, it is important to note, is not desire (cf. “You have made us
for Yourself, Oh Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in
You”), but the disordering of desires (concupiscence) that are no longer
subject to the control of human reason.8
Augustine vehemently argued that as a result of the fall, human
nature is deeply flawed and thus incapable of realising good and
attaining its true end in God. This deep flaw is expressed by
distinguishing between true freedom, libertas, which consists of the
human being’s whole-hearted directedness to its true goal of love of
God, and freedom of choice, liberum arbitrium, which refers to the
voluntary character of this directedness. As a result of the fall, liberty
has been lost, hence we humans are no longer free to love God, but we
do retain freedom of choice in our self-love or egoistic pride (amor sui).
Within this perversion of our true direction we remain free in the sense
that we sin willingly. Hence Augustine espouses a positive under-
standing of original sin. Since our free choice is qualified by our
bondage to sin, then in the condition of original sin we are actively
involved in a necessity of sinning. This is a pessimistic view which sees
sin not as the mere imitation of Adam’s sin (Pelagius) but as affecting
the whole person at depth, so that nothing else but God’s healing grace
in Jesus Christ can bring about the inner transformation of the person
and the directing or ordering of human desires to love of God.
The Pelagians believed that Augustine’s teaching on the severe con-
sequences of the fall so conditioned human freedom that it seriously
                                                                                                                                 
reasonable and desirable, and persuading us to will what they want us to will (De Civ.
Dei IV.32). The higher, spiritual truths are therefore beyond our grasp, and the darkness
of the sinner's mind can be overcome only by the light of Christ, whose grace works by
aiding our mental sight so that we may see to do the good (De Peccatorum Meritis et
Remissione II.v.5). God is described as the “Father of our awakening and illumination”
(Soliloquia I.i.2), in opposition to Satan who is the “Father of Lies” (John 8:44; 1 John 3:8),
the source of all error and ignorance (De Civ. Dei XI.13).
8. While Augustine has in focus mainly the sexual passions, at times he includes all
human rebellion against God (avarice, hatred, greed, pride, and so on) as signs of
concupiscence, so that he “is in touch with the potential chaos of human desires, each
with a life of its own, running out of control” – Neil Ormerod, Grace and Disgrace: A
Theology of Self-Esteem, Society and History (Newtown NSW: E.J. Dwyer, 1992) 104.
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undermined human responsibility. They maintained that Augustine
had made too many concessions to Manichean pessimism by
portraying sin as not merely accidental or contingent. The Pelagians
were more optimistic about human nature and upheld freedom as
indeterminacy, that is, as morally neutral in the face of good (virtue)
and evil (vice).9 We all find ourselves in the same situation as Adam
before his fall and the idea of divine justice requires that it is possible
for us to avoid sin and to become perfect, for it would be unjust of God
to condemn us for something we cannot escape. Augustine agreed that
God wants us to be without sin, and what God wants must be
attainable, but again and again Augustine stressed that without God’s
grace in Jesus Christ, fallen humankind cannot turn their hearts toward
the goal of love of God. His writings present us with a theology of
grace and freedom that can be summed up in the exhortation,
“command what You will, but give what You command” (Confessions,
Book X).10 Augustine’s torturous conversion experience (Confessions,
Book VIII) and his consciousness of the uncanny resistance of desire
and habit to performing good that is pleasing to God, led him to
conclude that humans have an inclination to evil that precedes and
informs each and every choice that they make. By virtue of our
inclusion in the first sin of Adam, Augustine believed that this
prevolitional bias is universal; thus freedom cannot be regarded as
indeterminate as the Pelagians maintained.
The polemic against Manichean Gnosticism, to sum up, pushed
Augustine to historicise evil and to locate the source of evil in the
rational will (this gives rise to the reatus which is a juridical category of
debt and punishment). The ethical-historical view of sin as not present
from the very beginning of creation but as beginning with the sin of
Adam is shared by the situationists discussed below, although the
                                                                                            
9. For Pelagius, the capability of freely choosing and doing the good (bonum naturae)
is the foundational form of grace. In addition to this basic form of grace, Pelagius
conceived of various concretisations of grace, such as the law of the Old Testament, the
teachings of Christ, and the redemptive grace of forgiveness of sins through Christ. See,
for example, Stephen Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology
(Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press, 1993) 83-90.
10. In the De Natura et Gratia Augustine began to work out the roles of nature and
grace. He held that God did not make human nature flawed, for every nature is created
good, yet human nature is sinful, from which he concluded that something has damaged
it (De Nat. et Grat. III.iii). Grace acts upon the damage done by sin by co-operating with
the intrinsic good in human nature. In De Libero Arbitrio, written some twenty years
before De Natura et Gratia, Augustine had already established that sin is a perverted
desire that pursues temporal things instead of eternal things, that evil lies in the turning
away of the will from the immutable Good to its own private good (De Lib. Arb.
II.xix.53.199). The perverse will or “pride” consists in abandoning God, to whom the soul
ought to cleave as its end, and becoming an end to itself (De Civ. Dei XIV.13.1).
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latter oppose any suggestion of sin as biologically inherited,
highlighting instead that the sin of Adam results in the reality of sin
entering human history (the Johannine “sin of the world” as an
external reality), where it exerts a negative influence on the
determination of human freedom. The Pelagian controversy, on the
other hand, forced Augustine to amplify the consequences of the fall to
the point of making sin an acquired or “second nature” (hence the
component of the vitium which is a biological category of inheritance),
so that the will of the person is held to be enslaved to sin. It is this
hereditary acquisition of a flawed nature that undergirds the universal
need for God’s redemptive grace in Christ, which is received in
baptism. The baptized are purged of all past sins, but the inclination to
sin remains and is addressed by the force of Christ’s healing grace
which transforms the person and empowers the will to do good, so
that the baptized may make progress toward their true end of union
with or love of God. The personalists discussed below, while they
reject any suggestion of a prepersonal dimension to sin, nonetheless
follow Augustine insofar as they view original sin as an internal (not
external) reality that manifests itself in the person’s unwillingness to
obey God and perform good that is pleasing to God.
It could be said that the import of the Augustinian analysis is that it
“enables us to see that two types of language have to be dialectically
related in speaking of evil as both moral and tragic: that of freedom
and that of inevitability, contingency and universality, responsibility
and inescapability”.11 But notwithstanding the enduring significance
of this dialectical relationship between freedom and inevitability,
which highlights the complexity of the reality denoted by original sin,
difficulties do arise with the Augustinian synthesis. The biggest
problem, from a modern standpoint, is the notion that we humans
biologically inherit a nature that is flawed due to the first sin of Adam.
How can something that is moral, and therefore pertains to the person,
be transmitted biologically? From the standpoint of evolving nature, it
is certainly legitimate to hold that the capacity for intellectual and moral
activity, as emergent properties of homo sapiens, is dependent on genes,
but to say that moral evil is biologically propagated is quite another
matter. A further problem arises in relation to Augustine’s rejection of
an ontological view of evil in favour of an ethical view: If we humans
inherit a flawed nature in which the will is enslaved to sin, does this
not imply that evil has ontological status? The argument put forward
by Augustine to the effect that sin is not in human nature (which is
                                                                                            
11. Stephen J. Duffy, “Our Hearts of Darkness: Original Sin Revisited”, Theological
Studies 49 (1988) 597-622, see p. 600.
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created good), but is an attribute of nature, does not effectively
overcome this problem. A final problem that also looms large in his
synthesis is: Given the necessity of sinning by virtue of inclusion in
Adam’s sin, what becomes of personal responsibility for sin? It is when
we turn to medieval theology that we find a new framework
introduced for elaborating the doctrine of original sin that to some
extent helps to alleviate these problems.
The first major development away from Augustine’s positive
portrayal of original sin appears in Anselm of Canterbury who defined
original sin negatively as the privation or absence of “owed justice” (the
voluntary conformity of human will to the will of God).12 Thomas
Aquinas made the next contribution by bringing together Augustine’s
identification of original sin with concupiscence (material element) and
Anselm’s negative definition of original sin as the absence of justice
(formal element) to arrive at his definition of original sin as the
privation of original justice.13 Thomas conceived of the state of original
justice as the effect of preternatural gifts given by God so that Adam
could attain his supernatural destiny (the vision of God).14 In the state
of original justice, Adam enjoyed a perfect balance between body and
soul, between the opposing inclinations of the sense faculties and the
superior faculties.15 What was lost by sin is the perfect harmony or
integrity of original justice, with the result that the human was reduced
to the state of “pure nature”.16 Concupiscence is viewed by Thomas as
part of the natural state of the human but, without the integrating
power of the special grace of original justice, concupiscence becomes
disordered. The natural inclination to good is still operative in the soul,
however it now finds itself in conflict with other competing desires,
with the result that it is diminished, but not destroyed, by sin.17 This
                                                                                            
12. See G. Vandervelde, Original Sin: Two Major Trends in Contemporary Roman Catholic
Reinterpretation (Amsterdam: Rodopi N.V., 1975) 27.
13. Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, q. 82, a. 3. While Thomas views concupiscence as the
material element of original sin, he does not identify the two. Since the loss of original
justice leads to loss of interior harmony, then concupiscence is regarded as a negative
disorder, not as a positive evil inclination of the will as in Augustine.
14. For Thomas, whose theology is based upon Aristotelian metaphysics, grace is
primarily elevating and is conceived as a new ontological quality of the soul (being raised
to a higher nature that brings fulfilment to the human over and above what the forces of
its nature can achieve), whereas in Augustine’s more existential analysis grace is
primarily healing (grace corrects nature and restores it to what it should be). For Thomas
grace is also healing, but the healing takes place through sinful nature being raised to a
new ontological level and thus to a new principle of operation and activity.
15. See Henri Rondet, Original Sin: The Patristic and Theological Background, tr. Cajetan
Finegan (Staten Island NY: Alba House, 1972) 161-62.
16. Summa Theologiae, Ia-IIae, 1. 87, a. 7.
17. Thomas views the effects of original sin in terms of a threefold good of nature: the
first refers to the principles that constitute nature which cannot be obliterated by sin; the
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diminishment, moreover, cannot take place in relation to its base
(rational nature), but only in respect of the realisation of its goal
(virtue) which is frustrated negatively by original sin and positively by
personal sin. The innate desire for good is therefore no longer able to
achieve its goal in a consistent manner, which led Thomas to conclude
that human nature is not totally corrupt, but suffers from a kind of
spiritual illness resulting from the disruption of the primeval harmony
between opposite inclinations. In this perspective, personal sin is
inevitable as in Augustine, not, however, because of the enslavement
of free will to sin, but on account of the lack of divine grace (“habitual
grace”), which precludes the possibility of personal integration in
relation to God (the sinner is deprived of the vision of God).
Thomas’ doctrine of original sin is notably different to Augustine’s
emphasis on the total enslavement of our will to sin, for the stress falls
on our natural inclination to virtue which is not destroyed by original
sin, although we are frustrated in our capacity to attain virtue since we
are deprived of a ready inclination to good in our natural state of
concupiscence. What we have in Thomas is a working out of the
doctrine of original sin in terms of the connection between grace and
nature (grace presupposes nature and brings it to perfection), so that
grace responds not primarily to the problem of sin, as in Augustine,
but to the problem of nature (elevation to a higher nature, to a new
principle of operation and activity, that is able to enjoy the vision of
God). The significance of Thomas’ concept of the primeval state of
original justice is that it serves to highlight the “essential” structure of
human nature as destined by God to a supernatural end, so that the
fundamental goodness of the human, and of the Creator, are both
firmly upheld. The strongly existential analysis of Augustine certainly
rings true with our historical experience of a disorder within ourselves
and our inability to do good, but this experience must not be allowed
to overshadow our essential nature as inviolably related to God who
                                                                                                                                 
second natural good concerns the natural inclination to virtue, which is rooted in rational
nature, and is diminished but not destroyed by sin; and the third natural good is original
justice. The damage caused by the loss of this latter good due to Adam’s sin is limited by
the other two natural goods. See Summa Theologiae I-II, 85, 1 & 2. The good of nature in
Thomas’ thought can be seen as arising from his appreciation of the interconnectedness
of reality (following Aristotle): real relations hold between God, the mind of man, and the
world of finite things (hence the a posteriori proofs of God’s existence), so that human
experience of the world leads to knowledge of the Cause of all things. The effects of
original sin are therefore seen as more pronounced on the human will (appetite for good)
than the mind (knowledge of truth).
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has determined to bestow upon the human the gift of participation in
the divine nature.18
While Thomas’ doctrine differs from that of Augustine in this
notable respect, nonetheless it shares one of the main problems that
were raised above. The problem stems from a literal interpretation of
the Genesis accounts, from which arises the assertion that the
diminishment in the capacity to realise good or virtue, which is the
result of the loss of original justice by Adam, is transmitted biologically
to his progeny. But again we must ask, How can Adam’s sin, which
has a personal and moral character, be thought of as inherited by his
progeny? As in Augustine’s synthesis, the key difficulty revolves
around the transmission of original sin. The modern day situationists
hold a far more intelligible view when they propose that the privation
of sanctifying grace is felt in the historical realm. The effects of original
sin are not biologically propagated but are to be conceived as historical
forces that enter into the inner determination of human freedom so
that our ability to realise good is weakened by the sin of the world.
When we come to the Council of Trent’s “Decree on Original Sin”
(1546), the Fathers were faced with the difficulty of Augustinian,
Anselmian, and Thomistic formulations vying with each other for
supremacy. The Fathers therefore sought to avoid formulating a
definition and opted instead to elucidate the nature of original sin by
describing its effects, which is reflected in the five canons.19 By
adopting this approach, the Fathers at times followed the positive
portrayal of original sin (aversio a Deo) embraced by the Council of
Orange (529 CE), and on other occasions proceeded to present a
negative view of original sin as the loss of original justice. But how can
these two different portrayals be reconciled? Even the fifth canon
directed against the Reformers remains vague about the precise nature
of original sin, and it was this persisting vagueness that eventually
gave rise to the more precise post-Tridentine definition of original sin
as the privation of sanctifying grace. The strength of this formulation is
                                                                                            
18. In Original Sin: A Code of Fallibility, 125, Christoph Theobald cautions against
confusing experience as “historical” with the “essential structure” of human beings (thus
Trent against the Reformers and Pius V against Baius), for such a confusion would
threaten the “fundamentally good creatureliness of human beings and the Creator”.
19. DS 1511-1515. Canons 1-4 mostly reaffirm the teaching of Orange (physical death,
as well as the death of the soul, is transmitted to Adam’s posterity; Pelagian imitation
theory is rejected; and the necessity of infant baptism is upheld). Only Canon 5, which is
directed against the Reformers, goes beyond restatement of previous conciliar positions.
Canon 5 rejects Luther’s teaching that concupiscence remains in the baptized and
constitutes sin in the true and proper sense, affirming instead that baptism wipes away
sin in the true and proper sense, although concupiscence as the “tinder of sin” (fomes
peccati) remains in the baptized.
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that it derives not from speculative arguments about the original state
of Adam, but from the sacramental life of the baptized Christian in the
present (sanctified) state. So powerful is this tradition that it continues
to be felt today in the situational reinterpretation of the doctrine, which
I discuss below.
When seeking to interpret the magisterial statements it must be
borne in mind that the modern era of historical-critical consciousness
had not yet dawned, meaning that the Fathers took a literal inter-
pretation of key biblical texts (Genesis 2-3; Rom 5:12). In determining
the precise didactic intention of the magisterial statements, we must
ask: What do they mean to say and what are they not saying? The
concern of Trent was to uphold the origine unum (one in origin) that
establishes the universality of sin as a presupposition for the
affirmation of the universal need for God’s redemptive grace in Jesus
Christ. The Fathers “did not intend to say more than that the unity of
original sin consists only in its origin.”20 Needless to say, the assump-
tion of monogenism and of Adam as an original unique progenitor
poses serious problems today for the theologian who must reckon with
historical-critical consciousness and the scientific view of the world.
The doctrine is clearly in need of reformulation and the next two
sections will address the various ways in which this has been
attempted.
But before taking our leave of this first section we must ask whether
it is possible to reconcile or bring together in some way the positive
and negative portrayals of original sin? The valid and enduring aspect
of Augustine’s existential analysis, to my mind, is that he focuses on the
material character of original sin; that is, human experience provides
ample evidence of the problem of the disordering of competing desires
and an inexplicable evil inclination within the heart (cf. Rom 7:14-25:
the divided-self) which leads us to confess that we have a flawed
nature in which we are actively complicit in sinning, hence our need of
being healed by the power of Christ’s grace. With regard to the
negative portrayal of original sin, on the other hand, where the focus
rests upon the formal element of original sin defined along more
ontological lines, the significant import lies in its not painting an overly
pessimistic picture of human nature as wholly corrupted by sin; it
reminds us that there is such a thing as “natural” concupiscence, which
is not sin but the raw material that God is graciously working with so
as to elevate humanity to a “higher nature” that represents the per-
fection of human nature (grace presupposes nature and brings it to
perfection). The evil inclination within us, then, should never be
                                                                                            
20. Piet Schoonenberg, Man and Sin (London: Sheed & Ward, 1965) 175.
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presented as the full picture, but must be complemented by a natural
inclination to good that is not destroyed by sin.21 For only by retaining
an inclination toward the transcendent good (what ought to be) can we
be conscious of an evil inclination that causes us to fall away from our
dignity and destiny as beings called to partake of the Supreme Good
and to behold the vision of God.
2. SITUATIONAL, PERSONALIST AND ESCHATOLOGICAL
REINTERPRETATIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN
Two trends have emerged in contemporary Catholic reinter-
pretation of original sin, namely, original sin as historical situation, on
the one hand, and as personal sin, on the other.22 Both are motivated by
dissatisfaction with the traditional doctrine that is seen as undermining
personal responsibility of the sinner, although they part company
when it comes to proposing a solution to the problem. The situationists
seek to do justice to the elements of the doctrine expressed in the
theological and magisterial traditions, and retain the notion of a
prepersonal dimension to sin, while the personalists reject the latter in
order to do full justice to the category of person.
(a) The situational reinterpretation is based upon the view of history
as the context and content of the human being, from which arises an
understanding of original sin as “the situational privation of sanc-
tifying grace that renders every being (analogously) guilty from the
moment of birth”.23 The post-Tridentine formula of original sin as the
privation of sanctifying grace is taken as the starting-point, to which is
added the concept of the human being as historical situatedness, which
results in a dynamic view of original sin. By privation of grace what is
intended is the “spatiotemporal” lack of grace in a sinful world (the
“sphere” of existence), which must be distinguished from the “trans-
cendental” presence of grace (the “horizon” of existence) that con-
stitutes an ineradicable Existential, an ontological determinant of the
situation of every human being. Privation is thought of as the negation
of the intended spatiotemporal presence of grace as historically
mediated through human beings. Each one of us is held to be an
historical mediator of grace for our fellow human beings and for future
generations. Hence the entrance of sin into the human world results in
                                                                                            
21. Bernard Sesboüe, “The Theological Rationalization of Original Sin”, in Original Sin:
A Code of Fallibility, 11-18, at 15, regards the two definitions represented by Augustine
and Thomas as “complementary emphases”.
22. G. Vandervelde in his Original Sin has examined Piet Schoonenberg, Karl Rahner,
and Karl-Heinz Weger as situationists, and A. Vanneste and U. Baumann as personalists.
23. Vandervelde, Original Sin, 147.
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a disruption of the intended spatiotemporal manifestation of grace.
The traditional phrase generatione, non imitatione is therefore inter-
preted as referring to the whole process of socialisation by means of
which a human being enters into the world and is inextricably caught
up in an intricate web of sinful relations that has characterised human
history from its beginning. This implies that being-situated in a sinful
world is not primarily a conscious decision but an inner determination
of human freedom that precedes personal sin.24 It is not adequate, on
this view, to portray sin as simply conscious acts of the will, for we
must recognise a prepersonal dimension to sin that attaches to the
human as historical being.
(b) It is precisely this prepersonal aspect of sin that is rejected by the
personalists who are keen to bring to centre stage the biblical emphasis
on sin as the unwillingness (as opposed to inability) of the person to
turn their hearts toward God. Vanneste, for example, contends that the
doctrine of original sin serves to highlight the breadth dimension of sin,
that is, the universality of personal or actual sins. “That all men are
born in original sin means that all are sinners from the first moment
that they are man because it happens to be a fact that all men sin.”25
But this axial assertion that all people in fact sin when they arrive at the
level of moral consciousness is jeopardised by the argument that the
free act of an individual person is by its very nature contingent and
thus unpredictable as to direction. If one insists on portraying history
in terms of the genuinely free acts of individuals, then the extent of
actual sins remains an open question. It appears that Vanneste affirms
the universal facticity of sin on the basis of the traditional Christian
tenet regarding the universal need for God’s redemptive grace in Jesus
Christ to realise our supernatural end. His position, note, does not
affirm the Augustinian emphasis on the radicality of sin, adopting
instead a more Thomistic line of argument where sin is seen as
weakening human nature, the essence of which remains intact as
inclining toward the good and directed toward its supernatural end.
The personal reinterpretation of Baumann differs from that of
Vanneste inasmuch as his concern rests primarily with the depth
dimension of personal sin, not the breadth dimension which is seen as
                                                                                            
24. Pannenberg explains how the lineage of the notion of the “sin of the world” can be
traced from Kant’s idea of a “kingdom” of evil, through Schleiermacher’s idea of a
“corporate life of sin”, through Ritschl’s doctrine of the “kingdom of sin”, to
Schoonenberg’s notion of original sin as the “being-situated” of human beings in their
sinful social setting; see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective
(trans. Matthew J. O’Connell; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985) 125-28.
25. Vandervelde, Original Sin, 284, citing A. Vanneste.
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one of three aspects of the depth dimension.26 This radicality of sin
recalls Augustine’s synthesis, although Baumann rejects any notion of
a prepersonal dimension to sin. He believes that the main thrust of the
traditional doctrine is the affirmation of the sola gratia (against
Pelagianism) which sheds light on the truth of the human’s personal
guilt before God: the depth of grace reveals the abyss of sin. The entire
rethinking of the doctrine revolves around the triad guilt-person-
responsibility, with “person” functioning as the central axis. The
deepest core of the human being, the person, or the “I”, is simply not
susceptible to objectification (be it historical, evolutionary, or
sociological) because it has to do with a transempirical relationship to
God. The existential method, according to Baumann, offers the best
approach, since sin is viewed as the sin of the person: at the root of sin
is decision, but in that decision “I” myself am decided; it is not merely
the case that something is decided (to obey or disobey a law). This
means that all actual sins are regarded as a wilful turning-away from
God (aversio a Deo) since there are only two possible responses to God:
“yes” (faith) or “no” (defiance).
To my mind there are elements in both the situational and
personalist reformulations of original sin that are valid and should be
brought into relationship with one another so as to elaborate the
complex nature of sin. The strength of the personalist position is that
the voluntary or active element of sinning is highlighted so that
personal responsibility for sin is strongly upheld. The weakness of this
position, however, is that it isolates the personal character of sin from
concrete human history and the structures of society. The situationist
reinterpretation is valid insofar as the historical activities of human-
kind clearly enter into the structures of society, including the activity of
sin, in which case the human is born into a preexisting situation of sin.
There exists, in other words, an involuntary or passive element which
amounts to a prepersonal dimension of sin. The situational synthesis
recalls Paul’s statement that “sin came into the world through one
man” (Rom 5:12), by which Paul intends to say that the first sin of
Adam has introduced external “powers” of sin into the world, powers
which seek to determine human freedom toward all manner of
evildoing (thus Adam’s posterity have all sinned). There exists, then, a
kind of involuntary (situation of sin) at the core of the voluntary
(personal freedom), which is due to the historical emergence of sin in
the world. The weakness of the personalist reinterpretation is that it
                                                                                            
26. Baumann presents three aspects of the depth dimension of sin: radicality, totality,
and universality.
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fails to accept any structural and hence involuntary element in the
interests of securing personal responsibility for sinful behaviour.
(c) In addition to the tendency today to interpret original sin as the
“sin of the world”, there is another approach that has been proposed
which is based on the “transformation of historical antecedence into
eschatological dynamism”.27 In this eschatological perspective, original
sin is thought along the lines of a contradiction or discrepancy between
what we humans presently are and what we are destined to become in
the person of Jesus Christ risen. It is by starting from the Ultimate, not
by starting from the past, that the reality of sin can be designated: “It is
the grandeur of the ‘second Adam’ that explains the ‘transgression’ of
the first, who is the symbol of humanity.”28 The key to putting both the
past and the present in perspective is the future reign of God’s
kingdom of grace. History can be seen for what it is only from the
vantage point of the final end that is proleptically realised in Jesus
Christ risen.29 The dynamics of the Ultimate leads to a reversal of the
order of presentation which traditionally dominated the doctrine of
original sin, for Christology rather than original sin becomes the
fundamental axis for the doctrine of soteriology. Instead of deducing
the significance of Jesus Christ from the doctrine of original sin,
theology today tends to proceed from the universal need for God’s
grace in his person as the centre and measure of the human, to a
derived doctrine of original sin. This approach is reflected in the
documents of Vatican II where we read that “it is only in the mystery
of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear…
Christ the new Adam…fully reveals man to himself and brings to light
his most high calling” (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern
World [ Gaudium et Spes] §22). The human vocation is to attain perfect
                                                                                            
27. C. Duquoc, “New Approaches to Original Sin”, Cross Currents  28 (1978) 189-200, see
p. 195.
28. Duquoc, “New Approaches to Original Sin”, 197. Karl Barth, it is worth noting,
strongly supports this view regarding the primacy of Christ when he writes about how
God desires to be our partner: God wants us to accept his merciful love for sinners in
accordance with the covenant of grace established from all eternity in the person of
Christ, the Elect One, who “takes the first place as the original”, not Adam, since it is in
Christ that God has decreed our determination to election and thus eternal blessedness.
See Church Dogmatics, IV/I, 512-513.
29. This fundamental point is underlined in Jewish apocalyptic writings. The discovery
of the Qumran Scrolls and the Nag Hammadi texts has led to a resurgence of interest in
these writings and their significance for Christian theology. Ernst Käsemann in his
seminal essay, “The Beginnings of Christian Theology”, New Testament Questions of Today
(Fortress and SCM Press, 1969) 82-107, reached the controversial conclusion that
“Apocalyptic was the mother of all Christian theology”; and Wolfhart Pannenberg in his
essay “Redemptive Event and History”, Basic Questions in Theology (London: SCM, 1970),
15-80, reintroduced apocalyptic universal history as the horizon that spans the whole of
Christian theology in general.
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integrity of being and completed personhood by our being conformed
to Christ, in the Spirit. The language used by Vatican II is positive, for
it is ontological language that highlights the primacy of grace in
bestowing upon the human being final fulfilment as “participation in
the divine nature” (Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation  [Dei
Verbum] §2). The story of creation should not be presented as tied up
with the garden of Eden, for “the way lies through another garden,
Gethsemane, and up the hill of Golgotha, where the tree of life was
planted”.30 The reality of sin is but one vector in this life of ours, which
is drawn by a second vector, grace: “Sin is located along a graced
horizon that humans are struggling toward…not paradise lost but the
kingdom ahead is the homeland.”31
The eschatological framework of the dynamics of the Ultimate lends
itself readily to the idea of evolving nature (active self-transcendence),
the inevitability of sin in the world, and a holistic view of redemption
that is not reduced to the mere forgiveness of individual sins. With the
emergence of the human properties of intelligence, morality, and
personal relatedness, new possibilities are opened up for the human
being. Yet at the same time the emergence of human consciousness has
introduced new demands on the human. What is distinct about the
human is that behaviour is no longer governed purely by genetically
produced instincts and appetites which preserve the self and herd;32
rather, the new possibilities and new demands opened up to the
human mean that peace is attained through the harmonising of
knowledge and action rather than by the satisfaction of the appetites.33
But in this evolutionary advance to rationality and self-consciousness,
                                                                                            
30. Duffy, “Our Hearts of Darkness”, 622.
31. Duffy, “Our Hearts of Darkness”, 618.
32. The primal instincts, drives, and emotions, such as aggression, territoriality, hatred,
vengeance, sexual appetite and prowess, fear, and jealousy, can destroy us if they are not
named and dealt with. They incline us toward sin, they are the “tinder of sin”, but they
are also, as Daly points out in his Creation and Redemption , 146, the “raw materials of
holiness”. Karl Rahner asserts that the natural drives and appetites constitute a “natural”
concupiscence (disorders that are morally neutral) that must be distinguished from
concupiscence that is the result of sin. See his essay, “The Theological Concept of
Concupiscence”, Theological Investigations 1 (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961) 347-382. See also
Piet Schoonenberg, Man and Sin, 79; Sebastian Moore, The Crucified Jesus is No Stranger
(New York: Seabury, 1981) 43-46; Stephen Duffy, The Dynamics of Grace: Perspectives in
Theological Anthropology (Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press, 1993) 226; and Denis
Edwards, The God of Evolution: A Trinitarian Theology (New York: Paulist, 1999) 65-66.
33. Daly, Creation and Redemption, 140, points out that Augustine spoke of the peace of
the irrational soul as the satisfaction of the appetites, but in a rational soul peace is
attained through the harmony of knowledge and action. The human, in other words,
must subordinate the appetites which it shares with the animals to the peace of the
rational soul which is referred to God; the desire within human nature must be directed
into the paths willed for it by God.
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cultural evolution, like biological evolution, takes place only through
the process of trial and error, so that it is little wonder that we should
speak of human fallibility when seeking to describe the human
predicament in the world.34
But in spite of our “fallen” nature we are still agents with
intentionality and continue to be referred beyond ourselves to
Something More wherein lies our final destiny and definitive identity.
In fact, it is precisely in the consciousness of guilt that humans come to
recognise that they “are not identical with the idea of their destiny”.35
It is through the experience of self-transcendence that we become
conscious of the distance that separates us from what ought to be, from
the as yet unrealised possibilities of our nature that seeks transcendent
meaning and goodness. The understanding that divine redemption in
the person of Jesus Christ is addressed to evolving nature implies that
redemption is to be conceived as a movement upwards toward a higher
nature.36 Integral to this movement upwards, of course, is the
forgiveness of sins and removal of guilt, but we must appreciate that
the bestowing of God’s merciful love on sinners is what establishes the
integrity of the human person oriented toward divine grace as the
horizon of life in the world.
Once it is appreciated that in the process of evolving nature the
higher nature always contains the lower that had prepared the way for
the actual event of self-transcendence, then the world is to be regarded
as a fundamental unity in which everything is linked to everything
else. The Incarnation of the eternal Word must therefore be considered
ontologically, not merely morally, as the goal of the movement of
evolving nature as a whole. The measure of the human is not sin, but
Jesus Christ risen, in whom the process of becoming has reached its
final goal of “divinisation” or participation in the divine nature. The
idea of evolving nature, coupled with the glorification of Jesus’
humanity in his resurrection from the dead, makes it clear that grace is
not extrinsic to nature, is not juxtaposed to nature, but is “something
                                                                                            
34. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture and Religion (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1993) 135-38, explains that cultural evolution involves a process of trial
and error, hence it is accompanied by our awareness of fallibility. Hefner, though,
equates our experiences of fallibility with sin. In the next section I will propose that such
experiences should not be equated with sin.
35. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective,  152.
36. Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr., The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the
Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 120. Rahner holds the same
view, for he regards the process of “active self-transcendence” as a movement toward a
higher nature that involves an increase of being to an already existing reality.
Redemption has to do with participating in the divine nature and thus attaining a
“higher” nature.
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magnificent that happens to nature. It is nature lit by a new light and
fired with a new vision.”37 The fact that it is precisely evolving nature
that makes the humanum possible serves to caution us against thinking
of nature in purely essentialist terms, for this would mean that “neither
grace nor sin can alter the nature of homo sapiens”.38 The picture being
painted here is congruous with the Thomistic axiom that grace
presupposes nature and brings it to perfection, which amounts to a
positive construal of the grace-nature relationship.
The phenomenon of human self-transcendence indicates that
humans have their centre not only within themselves (I-as-developing-
self) but also outside of themselves (I-as-situated-by-otherness).39
Hence human nature is in a state of becoming which has human
identity and destiny as its goal. In this dynamic perspective it follows
that efficient causality does not adequately account for human activity
in the world, and since the cosmos has become conscious of itself in the
human being this in turn implies that efficient causality alone cannot
adequately account for the cosmos as a whole. What emerges is the
primacy to be accorded to final causality, whence it follows that the
dynamics of the Ultimate offers the most promising framework for a
rethinking of the doctrine of original sin.
3. FOUR THESES FORMULATED IN AN ESCHATOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
In light of the critical discussion above, I will now formulate four
theses that elaborate in a systematic way the understanding of the
reality designated by the term original sin from the vantage point of
“emergenist monism” and the resurrection of Jesus Christ, who is the
new emergent whole or new creation in person.40
Thesis 1. Person-in-nature. Since the human being is the product of
biological evolution, it has natural drives, appetites, and instincts that are
attached to the genetic side of its inheritance. The human is moved by its
                                                                                            
37. Daly, Creation and Redemption, 132.
38. Daly, Creation and Redemption, 132.
39. Frans Jozef van Beeck, God Encountered,  Vol. 2/3 (Collegeville MN: Liturgical Press,
1995) 113-122, maintains that “integrity” is made up of two components: “identity”
(interiority, our immanent original selves, the I-as-developing-self) and “alienation”
(exteriority, our situated selves, the I-as-situated-by-otherness). These two elements exist
in mutual interpenetration although the relationship is asymmetric inasmuch as identity
harbours our native capacity for transcendence and is thus “initiating” in engaging the
world of otherness, whereas alienation holds much potential and is thus not so much
initiating as “expectant”. The upshot of this is that human identity is always a
“responsive identity” in the dynamic quest for self-actualisation.
40. The first three theses are similar to those proposed by Denis Edwards in his The God
of Evolution, 64-70. Edwards, following Rahner, subscribes to the situationist reinter-
pretation of original sin, which is evident in his proposed Thesis 2.
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natural desires, yet it takes much wisdom to direct them constructively in
order to attain integration of the self. There exists a natural lack of congruence
between the innate natural desires and the human spirit which harbours the
integral self. This “natural” concupiscence is not sin or the result of sin, but it
does incline toward sin.
The theological tradition has described the disordered drives and
desires that humans experience as “concupiscence”, which is the result
of the original sin of Adam. This first thesis, however, draws attention
to the fact that the natural conditions of human existence in the world
constitute a state of disorder inasmuch as the natural desires and
drives are in need of integration into the developing self. This natural
concupiscence, intrinsic to being a spiritual creature who is at the same
time limited, finite, and bodily, is not sin, but it certainly is the
instrument or tinder of sin (fomes peccati), since it is as prone to actual
sin as kindling is to catching fire; it is also compounded by actual sin.
This does not mean that human nature is sinful, but it does point to a
sickness of nature that constitutes a precondition for personal sinning.
Hence the need for much wisdom (acquired through trial and error)
and for sanctifying grace in directing and integrating natural desires
into paths willed by God, that is, into paths that lead to new
possibilities of being in the world or to a higher nature (participation in
the divine nature).
While the natural conditions of human existence are experienced as
inherently fallible, at the same time the competing desires (the lower
level sense appetites and drives must be integrated through intellectual
and moral activity) are to be acknowledged as “the raw materials of
holiness” (Gabriel Daly) in God’s ongoing creative activity in the
world. The reality of sin, which is known in self-consciousness (guilt),
cannot be attributed to the lower level physical properties of the
human person. Yet at the same time we must appreciate that the
person is always a person-in-nature who is required to balance and
integrate the competing desires into the developing self. Insofar as this
lack of harmony that is felt by the human as a natural being is part of
the human condition from the beginning, it can be regarded as
“original”, although it is not sin. The movement from biological
evolution to cultural evolution means that peace is attained at a higher
level for human life than it is for animal life. Hence the movement
upwards inevitably involves a loss of innocence.
Thesis 2. Person-in-history. The human being is born into a historical
situation of sin which enters into and becomes an inner determination of
human freedom. There exists a prepersonal dimension to sin that attaches to
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the human as historical being. The social-cultural sphere of existence is
experienced as a situational privation of sanctifying grace.
The history of humanity’s rejection of God, which gives rise to a
historical situation of sin, is captured by Paul’s statement that “sin
came into the world through one man” (Rom 5:12). In this key biblical
text, Paul intends to assert that sin does not re-enter history ever anew
in seeking to gain mastery over human freedom and determine its fate
toward death; rather, sin is encountered as an already existing power
external to the individual that enters into and becomes an inner
dimension of each person’s situation. In such a perspective, original sin
emerges as a dynamic reality, for the personal sins of each individual
are seen as mediating and contributing to the historical power of sin
and thus to the historical privation of sanctifying grace in the world.
The human being experiences disordered drives and impulses not only
from the genetic side of its inheritance, but also from the cultural side
of evolutionary history.
In this second thesis we are required to recognise that in the act of
sinning we are never acting purely alone (against a moralistic conception
of sin, as in Vanneste), but are conspiring with powers of sin in the
world, with the result that we are adding to the collective burden of
humanity. The history of personal and communal sin that enters into
the situation of each person, moreover, is sin only in an analogous
sense since it is not yet personal and actual (personal sin is the
subjective ratification of the objective situation conveyed by the term
original sin), and it compounds the inherent fallibility due to the
human’s naturally disordered desires that are in competition with each
other, so that the task of integration of the developing self is further
frustrated and impeded.
With regard to divine salvation, this second thesis cautions against
reducing salvation to the mere forgiveness of individual sins, for God’s
saving work in Jesus Christ involves the conquest of the powers of sin
in the world that thwart God’s good purpose for the world (cf. 1 John
2:2; Rom 5:12-21). On the view that the individual sinner acts in
solidarity and complicity with the sin of the world, it is the entire
history of sinful humanity that has been reconciled to God on Calvary,
not merely the individual sinner. The conquest of the powers of sin in
the world implies that the power of God’s grace in the Crucified One
now enters into and becomes an inner dimension of each baptized
person, so that the freedom of Christ becomes the freedom of the
baptized person to love God above all else and attain personal identity
and integrity of being.
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Thesis 3. Person as Responsive Identity. The reality of original sin
impacts upon the whole person. It should not be associated solely with the
biological or cultural side of the human being. In light of our peculiar
exocentricity and the emergenist theory of personhood, the person is required
to respond to both genetic and cultural conditionings. The source of moral evil
therefore lies in the human will and the person cannot escape responsibility for
evildoing.
This third thesis acknowledges the biblical view of sin as a wilful
turning-away from God, which finds further expression in Augustine’s
positive understanding of original sin as aversio a Deo and Baumann’s
existential conception of original sin as the “depth” dimension of sin.
In the confessing of sin we are conscious not only of our deliberate
personal sins, but also of a deep complicity with sin. The depth
dimension of sin within the person is acknowledged in the awareness
of “ontological guilt”, which is the guilt that follows when “we are
aware that we transcend the structures that perpetuate the conditions
of original sin but choose instead to remain in complicity with those
structures”.41
The claim being made in this third thesis is consistent with the
emergenist theory of personhood where the physical causes of the
emergence of the mental life (life of intentionality) do not completely
determine the outcome of the mental life, thereby leaving room for
genuine mental causation (whole-part influence or top-down
causality). The person, as the whole in that complex system which is
the human-brain-in-the-human-body-in-social-relations, is the sup-
reme example of whole-part influence which is exerted not only on its
physical body (the level of natural properties = Thesis 1) but also on its
surrounding world, including the human world of other persons (the
level of social-cultural properties = Thesis 2). The existence of multiple
layers of properties that are interdependent but not mutually reducible
to one another, means that the person as the highest level whole in the
hierarchical complex is ultimately responsible for its behaviour and the
direction that it gives to its intentional life. In the perspective of this
third thesis, divine salvation has to do with personal conversion and
the attainment of real freedom of the self (cf. Gal 5:1, 13-14). To
experience this real freedom, which is to live “according to the Spirit”
(Rom 8:1-8; cf. Gal 5:22-23), is to be introduced to a new mode-of-
being-in-the-world where the final graciousness of reality is allowed to
provide the basic orientation to personal existence in the world.
                                                                                            
41. Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, The Fall to Violence: Original Sin in Relational Theology
(New York: Continuum, 1994) 138-139.
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Thesis 4. Person in Jesus Christ. From the perspective of the dynamics
of the Ultimate revealed in Jesus Christ risen, who is the centre and measure
of the human, the reality of original sin denotes the gap or discrepancy that
exists between what we humans presently are and what we are destined to
become in the glorified Christ. Sin does not constitute our first ontological
status; it is not our original reality, for the deeper situation that we humans
are born into is our being created in God’s image (imago Dei) and our being
destined thereby to partake of the divine nature and enjoy the beatitude of
eternal life.
This fourth thesis acknowledges the directional qualification of
present reality, which is to say that there can be no original perfection
at the beginning of creation; rather, the first human is inherently finite,
limited, and fallible (Note: the classical doctrine recognises this insofar
as it holds that in Adam’s state of integrity – posse non peccare – he was
still open to temptation and to falling into sin). In the context of
making something, the term “good” is always good in relation to some
purpose. Thus in the context of the biblical creation story “good” can
only mean “that creation is good for that which God intends it”.42 It is
precisely the inherent fallibility of the human being that sets the stage
for the gracious bestowing of God’s merciful love upon sinners whose
vocation as creatures consists in their inviolable relationship to the
living God. The goodness of creation is not an ethical or objective
judgement that the human exercises. Rather, the assertion of the
Genesis account is that creation is good in the eyes of God who alone is
able to view all things from the vantage point of the final purpose for
all-that-is. The divine blessing (Gen 1:28) given at creation, which
continues in history through the genealogies43 incorporated by the
Priestly writer into the Book of Genesis, is what guarantees the
meaning and purpose of human existence, notwithstanding the
experience of human life as fragmented, limited, fallible, and always
threatened by anxiety, insecurity and non-being. The emphasis in
Genesis on the divine blessing that continues effectively in history
means that redemption is not something added to creation; rather,
“creation and redemption belong together as the obverse and reverse
                                                                                            
42. Claus Westermann, Creation, trans. John J. Scullion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1974) 61.
43. The Priestly (P) writer has organised the Book of Genesis according to the toledoth
formula – “these are the generations of” – which appears five times in the primeval
history (2:4a; 5:1; 6:9; 10:1; 11:10) before Terah, the father of Abraham (11:26), and five
times in the patriarchal history (11:27; 25:12; 25:19; 36:1; 37:2). See Frank Moore Cross,
Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic  (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1973) 293-
325, especially 301-305; and Richard Clifford, “The Hebrew Scriptures and the Theology
of Creation”, Theological Studies  46 (1985) 521.
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of the same theological coin”.44 The history of humanity, though
plagued and thwarted by the detrimental consequences of sin, is
nonetheless always a history that holds the inviolable promise of new
beginnings because transcended by God’s original and originating
blessing. It is this presence and activity of the living God in our midst
that gives a directional qualification to present reality.
This directional qualification of created reality is especially high-
lighted in the eschatological dualism of Jewish apocalyptic thought,
where history is viewed in terms of a disjunction between the present
evil age and the glorious age to come.45 For the apocalyptists, the full
meaning of history can be apprehended only from the vantage point of
the end of history. It is apparent in Paul’s writings that he views the
death of the Crucified One as the apocalyptic event inasmuch as the
“principalities and powers” (1 Cor 2:8; 15:24-26; Col 1:16; 2:15; Eph
1:21; 6:12) in the world have been vanquished by this unique death.46
The death and resurrection of Christ reveals the “mystery” of the
divine will that has been set forth “as a plan for the fullness of time, to
unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth” (Eph
1:10). It is from the standpoint of the fullness of time present in the
person of Christ that we are given a unique glimpse into the divine
plan for all things. Thus the reality of original sin should be reflected
upon in light of this eschatological event which truly illuminates the
human condition and the kind of hope that Christians must give
witness to in a world groaning for salvation (Rom 8:18-24).
In light of the directional qualification of present reality, the first
three theses formulated above can readily be subsumed under the
fourth thesis. The first three alert us to the need to hold together in
dialectical tension the negative-ontological and positive-existential
portrayals of original sin, but it is only when this dialectical
relationship is placed within the eschatological framework of the
fourth thesis that the complex system becomes a more intelligible
whole. The question of eschatological salvation in the Risen One is not
                                                                                            
44. Bernhard W. Anderson, “Mythopoeic and Theological Dimensions of Biblical
Creation Faith”, Creation in the Old Testament  (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) 6.
45. See Henry Novello, “The Nature of Evil in Jewish Apocalyptic: The Need for
‘Integral’ Salvation”, Colloquium 35/1 (2003) 47-63, especially 54-55. In this essay I
propose that the “cosmic dualism” (the battle being waged without) and the “ethical
dualism” (the battle being waged within) that are to be found in the apocalyptic writings
function effectively only when they are placed within the framework of an “es-
chatological dualism” that anticipates the glorious age to come when the present evil age
shall be no more. It is worth noting that cosmic dualism (powers external to the
individual) bears a family resemblance to the situational analysis of original sin, while
the emphasis in ethical dualism (evil inclination within the heart) parallels the personalist
reinterpretation of original sin.
46. Novello, “The Nature of Evil in Jewish Apocalyptic”, 60-61.
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primarily about how the individual is to be saved from eternal
perdition in hell, but about how the whole movement of evolving nature
will arrive at its ontological perfection as planned and willed by God
from all eternity. The Incarnation of the eternal Son that culminates in
his paschal mystery has to do with the “divinisation” of created reality,
that is, a “new creation” or “new emergent whole” in which the
identity of the person (thesis 3) is definitively established in con-
junction with a completely reconciled social-historical process (thesis 2)
and a fully transfigured cosmic-biological process (thesis 1). Salvation
in the person of Jesus Christ, as the fullness of evolving creation, has a
complex or integral character that includes physical (new embodied
existence in a new creation), moral (elimination of sin), and
eschatological (real freedom in glorious union with God) dimensions,
all of which are intimately intertwined, yet not mutually reducible to
one another. In this holistic and complex perspective, human
consciousness of the distance that separates us mortal sinners from
what ought to be  is consciousness of the reality denoted by the term
original sin; that is to say, we are aware that there is something tragic
in the human condition which is marked by a lack of personal, social, and
cosmic integration. It is by looking forward to the Risen One, to the new
age to come, not backward to some past epoch in primeval history, that
we come to appreciate the reality of the human condition and what
evolving creation is destined to become by the workings of God’s
unfathomable breathing life into things that do not exist (creatio ex
creatione).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
(a) The main concern of the Council of Trent was to uphold the
origine unum (i.e. the unity of original sin consists in its origin) in order
to establish the universality of sin as a presupposition for the Christian
claim regarding the universal need for God’s redemption wrought in
Jesus Christ. In the eschatological perspective presented above, since
the destiny of humanity is to be elevated or “drawn up” (John 12:32)
into the glorified humanity of Christ and enjoy the beatitude of the
risen life, the unity of original sin is established by the fact that no one
attains to their supernatural destiny in this life, for human existence is
a being unto death. In light of the fact that time is still running its
course and death is the horizon of life, all inevitably experience the
lack of personal, social and cosmic integration that the term original sin
denotes, while at the same time this fundamental experience of our
existence in the world is made possible by our consciousness of being
referred to Something More, to the Wholly Other, who is the absolute
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source and ultimate term of the active process of human self-
transcendence.
It is helpful when reflecting on the significance of time to consider
the event of the Incarnation as the eschatological union of time and
eternity in the person of Christ, so that it can be said that Christ is the
hypostatic union of time (humanity) and eternity (divinity).47 On this
view, eternity is seen as the meaning of time and time appears as the
expression of eternity. While time is not eternity and eternity is not
time, nonetheless given the eschatological union of time and eternity in
Christ neither can be considered without the other: “we can say that
the humanity of Christ or the time of Christ is God’s point of
observation of other times whence all other times are measured.”48
What is more, since it was as a consequence of his resurrection from
the dead that the time of the Crucified One was sublated by God’s
eternity, this means that my life-time is determined by the time of
Christ who bestows God’s eternity upon me. This takes place in the
event of my death when my time comes to an end and I enter
definitively into Christ’s time as the sublating fulfilment of time (which
implies resurrection at death). However, personal identity and
integrity of being are not fully established at death (as the entering of
my time into Christ’s time) for not until the whole of history (upon
which I have left my mark, for both good and ill) and the entire cosmos
enter into eternity will personal, social, and cosmic integration be
finally established in a “new heaven and new earth”. The upshot of all
this is that no one prior to death can attain that elevation to
participation in the divine nature which is the risen life. Hence human
existence is characterised by a fundamental discrepancy or gap
between what we presently are and what we are destined to become in
the life to come.
(b) In addition to the concern to establish that the unity of original
sin consists in its origin, a concomitant concern of the traditional
                                                                                            
47. Tibor Horvath makes this suggestion in Chapter 3 of his Eternity and Eternal Life:
Speculative Theology and Science in Discourse (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
1993). Horvath regards the eschatological union of time and eternity in Christ as the “first
principle in Christian eschatology”.
48. Horvath, Eternity and Eternal Life, 73. Eberhard Jüngel in his Death: The Riddle and the
Mystery, trans. Iain and Ute Nicol (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974) 118, holds a
similar view when he says that each human life-time is genuinely historical and ir-
replaceable because it is “a moment in God’s history with all men”; every human life is
ontologically defined by the “humanity of God”. Pope John Paul II, Crossing the Threshold
of Hope (New York: Alfred A. Knop, 1994) 74, could also be mentioned here, for he
employed the Gospel metaphor of “the vine” and “the branches” (John 15:1-8) to high-
light the view that the paschal mystery of Christ is “grafted onto the history of humanity,
onto the history of every individual”. Each human life-time, then, is hidden and taken up
into the life of God, who is our beyond.
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doctrine of original sin is the affirmation of the sola gratia, directed
against Pelagianism. The eschatological argument presented in this
essay certainly lends its support to this traditional teaching. For if
salvation is conceived as “participation in the divine nature” (Dei
Verbum §2; cf. 2 Pet 1:4) by means of “being made partners” in the
paschal mystery of Christ (Gaudium et Spes §22; cf. Rom 6:5; 8:11), then
this must come as God’s gift of pure grace, in the Spirit. The human
being simply has no power within itself to conquer death in its full or
integral sense (i.e. physical, moral, and eschatological death) and
secure personal identity and ontological fulfilment. We are conscious
of being engaged with a process of self-transcendence (exocentricity),
of having intentionality and thus of being referred beyond ourselves to
the other and ultimately to the eternal Other who is our beyond, yet
personal integration proves to be ever elusive. For the self is
experienced as divided against itself and death appears as the horizon
of life, so that whatever fragments of meaning and goodness are
realised in this transient life risk being reduced to meaninglessness and
nothingness (cf. Jean-Paul Sartre) and existence itself risks becoming an
absurdity. Only if God takes the whole of our lives as we have
concretely lived them and graciously heals and transforms them into
the wholeness that God has determined for humanity in the person of
the Son  (the incorruptible wholeness referred to in Scripture as
“eternal life”) can personal identity be definitively established.
(c) We need to appreciate that the involuntary (prepersonal) and
voluntary (personal) dimensions of sin should not be cleanly separated
for the sake of conceptual clarity.49 A dialectical tension exists between
original sin as a situational privation of sanctifying grace and active
rebellion against God. The state of natural concupiscence perforce
requires us to recognise an involuntary element intrinsic to human
nature, for we do not inherit a nature that is harmonious; rather, as
consciously self-transcending, what we inherit must be brought to
perfection by means of human freedom into an integrated whole that
represents a higher nature than the previously existing reality. The
historical situation, though, compels us to affirm another involuntary
dimension of sin external to the individual, which is closely related to
the internal condition of human nature (there exists a symbiosis of
genes and culture). Yet these two closely interrelated prepersonal
dimensions of sin are not the sole sources of sin, for the fact that we
actively conspire both with the lower level sense appetites and the evil
                                                                                            
49. Brian O. McDermott, “The Theology of Original Sin: Recent Developments”,
Theological Studies 38 (1977) 478-512, plainly makes this point: “original sin and personal
sin do not stand opposed as simply the involuntary and the voluntary” (p. 512).
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forces in history underlines the voluntary dimension of sin, which is
acknowledged in our confession of guilt and the need for personal
conversion.
To conclude, the human person’s complicity with sin is to be seen as
grounded in both self (freedom) and a negative involuntary that
attaches to the human as both natural being and historical being. What
the term “original sin” expresses is the understanding that sin is
located at a deeper level than the mere individual act (against a
moralistic conception of sin). Original sin points to motivational
structures that precede and underlie the actions of the person, and the
deadly fate of the human condition apart from God’s redemption in
Jesus Christ who has conquered the powers of sin and death in the
world so that we may walk in the freedom of new life “according to
the Spirit” which involves the transformation of life “according to the
flesh” (Rom 8:1-11). The person is not only a person-in-nature and a
person-in-history, but also a person-in-the-Risen-One who, as the new
creation and the meaning of history as a whole, saves us from the
condition of original sin so that we may experience, in our ecclesial
communities of faith, the freedom and joy of personal, social and
cosmic integration. The new life that we enjoy in the Spirit of the Risen
One is never completed in this life, however, for death remains the
horizon of life, and the glorious resurrection life remains the firm
Christian hope for the completed wholeness of evolving nature.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
